Jean Charte v. American Tutor Inc by unknown
2019 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-12-2019 
Jean Charte v. American Tutor Inc 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019 
Recommended Citation 
"Jean Charte v. American Tutor Inc" (2019). 2019 Decisions. 715. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019/715 
This August is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2019 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 18-1979 
_______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex rel. 
JEAN CHARTE 
 
 v. 
 
 AMERICAN TUTOR, INC.; JAMES WEGELER, JR.; 
JAMES WEGELER, SR.; SEAN WEGELER  
 
 Jean Charte, 
                                              Appellant 
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 3-10-cv-03318) 
District Judge: Hon. Anne E. Thompson  
______________ 
 
Argued January 15, 2019 
________ 
Before: AMBRO, HARDIMAN, and FUENTES, Circuit 
Judges. 
 
  (Opinion Filed: August 12, 2019 
2 
 
Sean F. Byrnes, Esq. [Argued] 
Byrnes O’Hern & Heugle 
28 Leroy Place 
Red Bank, NJ 07701 
 
 Counsel for Appellant 
 
Michael F. Bevacqua, Jr., Esq. [Argued] 
Brian M. Block, Esq. 
Mandelbaum Salsburg 
3 Becker Farm Road 
Suite 105 
Roseland, NJ 07068 
 
 Counsel for Appellees 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
Jean Charte was sued by her former employers in New 
Jersey state court for defamation, tortious interference with 
advantageous economic relations, and product disparagement. 
While that lawsuit was pending, Charte brought this qui tam1 
                                                 
1 “Qui tam is short for the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino 
rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, which means 
‘who pursues this action on our Lord the King’s behalf as 
well as his own.’” Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States 
ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 769 n.1 (2000). Under the False 
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action against her former employers on behalf of the United 
States and the State of New Jersey. As required by the False 
Claims Act, the qui tam action was filed under seal and 
remained under seal while the United States Government 
investigated the allegations and decided whether to intervene 
in the action.2 
 
The qui tam action remained under seal for over seven 
years, as the Government considered whether to intervene.3 
During this lengthy seal period, the state court action was 
dismissed without prejudice after the parties entered into a 
settlement agreement. Five years later, the Government chose 
not to intervene in the qui tam action, and the District Court 
unsealed the complaint.4 Accordingly, pursuant to the False 
Claims Act, Charte proceeded with the qui tam action against 
her former employers.5 
 
                                                                                                             
Claims Act, “a private person, known as a relator, may bring 
a qui tam civil action ‘for the person and for the United States 
Government’ against the alleged false claimant, ‘in the name 
of the Government.’” Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. United 
States ex rel. Hunt, 139 S. Ct. 1507, 1510 (2019) (quoting 31 
U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1)). 
2 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (providing that complaints filed 
by private persons must “be filed in camera” and “remain 
under seal for at least 60 days”). 
3 See id. § 3730(b)(3) (stating that the Government “may, for 
good cause shown, move the court for extensions” of the 
sixty-day seal period). 
4 See id. § 3730(b)(4)(B). 
5 See id. § 3730(c)(3). 
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At the summary judgment stage, the District Court 
found that the qui tam action was barred by New Jersey’s 
equitable entire controversy doctrine and effectively 
dismissed the complaint. We disagree and conclude that the 
entire controversy doctrine is inapplicable. For the following 
reasons, we will vacate the judgment of the District Court and 
remand for further proceedings. 
 
I. 
 
From July 2005 until her termination in September 
2007, Jean Charte was employed by American Tutor, Inc. 
(“American Tutor”), a family-owned corporation that 
provides tutoring services to school districts in New Jersey 
and other states. Charte initially worked as a tutor in the 
Asbury Park School District. The following year, in July 
2006, she became a regional district manager. As District 
Manager, Charte supervised the tutoring services provided by 
American Tutor to several school districts in New Jersey.  
 
During her time as District Manager, Charte became 
aware of American Tutor’s questionable billing and recruiting 
practices. In the summer of 2007, she began to express her 
concerns to James M. Wegeler6 and Sean Wegeler, brothers 
who served as officers of American Tutor. That fall, in 
September 2007, Charte was terminated. Thereafter, Charte 
contacted the New Jersey Department of Education and the 
United States Department of Education, among others, and 
informed them about the practices she had observed while 
employed by American Tutor. 
                                                 
6 James M. Wegeler was improperly plead in the qui tam 
action as “James Wegeler, Jr.” Wegeler Decl. ¶ 1, JA 98.  
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A. The State Court Action 
 
Nearly one year after Charte’s termination, Jim 
Wegeler, the owner of American Tutor, his son James M. 
Wegeler,7 and American Tutor filed a complaint in the 
Superior Court of New Jersey against Charte and her new 
employers. The complaint asserted three tort claims against 
Charte: defamation, tortious interference with advantageous 
economic relations, and product disparagement.8 It alleged, 
inter alia, that, after her termination, Charte made “false and 
defamatory statements to third parties” about Jim Wegeler, 
his son James M. Wegeler, and American Tutor, “including 
but not limited to allegations of illegal and unethical business 
practices.”9 The third parties were identified as American 
Tutor’s business competitors, American Tutor’s clients, 
school district officials, New Jersey Department of Education 
officials, and United States Department of Education 
officials. 
 
 In January 2009, Charte answered the complaint and 
asserted several counterclaims, including one for defamation. 
Over three and a half years later, all parties in the state court 
action signed an “Agreement Regarding Terms of 
                                                 
7 James M. Wegeler was also improperly plead in the state 
court action as “James Wegeler, Jr.” Id. at ¶ 2, JA 98. 
8 The complaint asserted the following claims against 
Charte’s new employers: negligent hiring, negligent retention, 
and negligent supervision. The complaint also sought to hold 
the new employers liable for Charte’s tortious conduct on a 
theory of respondeat superior.  
9 JA 26. 
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Dismissal.”10 Under the agreement, Charte and her former 
employers agreed to dismiss, without prejudice, all claims 
and counterclaims asserted in the state court action. The next 
month, in August 2012, the Superior Court of New Jersey 
dismissed the case pursuant to the agreement. 
 
B. The Federal Qui Tam Action 
 
While the state court litigation was ongoing, in June 
2010, Charte filed this qui tam action in the District Court 
against Jim Wegeler, his sons James M. and Sean Wegeler, 
and American Tutor. She alleged that her former employers 
violated both the New Jersey and federal False Claims Acts11 
by, inter alia, submitting false claims to local school districts 
in New Jersey for reimbursement of tutoring services.12 In 
particular, American Tutor allegedly submitted invoices for 
payment of “tutoring services that were never received by 
                                                 
10 Id. at 67.  
11 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:32C-3. 
12 Under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act of 1965, the federal Government provides funding to 
States for supplemental educational services such as tutoring. 
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 638 
n.22 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act of 1965 provided federal grants to finance supplemental 
educational programs in school districts with high 
concentrations of children from low-income families.”). 
States then disburse the federal funding through local boards 
of education. New Jersey and its local school districts 
received Title I funding for the purpose of providing 
supplemental educational services.  
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students” by billing “for students who were absent from 
tutoring services,” and also billing “in numbers in excess of 
actual students participating” in the tutoring services.13 
Moreover, according to the complaint, the Wegelers 
“authorized and ratified” the alleged violations of the False 
Claims Acts.14  
 
In accordance with the requirements of the Acts, the 
qui tam action was filed under seal and remained sealed while 
the Government investigated Charte’s claims.15 During this 
seal period, Charte could not disclose the existence of the qui 
tam action. As a result, Charte’s former employers were 
unaware that they held two simultaneous roles in different 
forums: they were plaintiffs in state court and defendants in 
federal court. It was during this mandatory seal period that the 
state court action was settled and dismissed. 
 
 The qui tam action stayed under seal for over seven 
years—until October 2017,16 when the District Court 
                                                 
13 JA 54. 
14 Id. at 55, 57. 
15 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:32C-5(c); 
see also United States ex rel. Grupp v. DHL Express (USA), 
Inc., 742 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing United States ex 
rel. Pilon v. Martin Marietta Corp., 60 F.3d 995, 998–99 (2d 
Cir. 1995)) (explaining that “[t]he purpose of the sealing 
provisions is to allow the government time to investigate the 
alleged false claim and to prevent qui tam plaintiffs from 
alerting a putative defendant to possible investigations”). 
16 The seal period was so long because Charte consented to 
(and the Court approved) the Government’s repeated requests 
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to extend the initial sixty-day seal period. See 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3730(b)(3).  
 
Our dissenting colleague thus correctly notes that 
American Tutor “spent seven years in the dark about Charte’s 
qui tam claim.” Dissent Op. 3-4. We nevertheless emphasize 
that the Government, not Charte, is largely responsible for the 
length of this case. Notwithstanding Charte’s consent to some 
extensions, most of the seven-year period is directly 
attributable to the Government. After the District Court gave 
the Government until February 1, 2013 to decide whether it 
would intervene, the Government sought, and received, 
extensions from the Court, this time without Charte’s consent. 
It was not until four and a half years passed, and Charte’s 
motion urging the Government to act, that the Government 
finally decided not to intervene and the District Court could 
therefore unseal the complaint.  
 
We note that during the seal period, in June 2016, the 
Government brought criminal charges against Jim Wegeler, 
alleging tax evasion, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201, and tax 
fraud, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2). After Wegeler pled 
guilty to one count of tax evasion and one count of tax fraud, 
Charte filed a “Motion to Intervene in the Criminal 
Proceedings for a Limited Reason and for a Relator’s Share 
Award” in the criminal matter and the qui tam action before 
us. JA 20. The District Court denied the motion. Charte’s 
consolidated appeal of that denial is currently pending before 
our Court.  
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unsealed the complaint after being notified by the 
Government of its decision not to intervene.17 As a result, 
Charte proceeded as the qui tam relator and served the 
complaint on American Tutor.18  
 
In February 2018, American Tutor moved for 
summary judgment. The next month, pursuant to its unsealing 
order, the District Court requested the Government’s input 
before ruling on the motion. The Government did not oppose 
dismissal of the action “should the Court determine that such 
dismissal is appropriate under the law, so long as such 
dismissal is without prejudice” to the Government.19 
 
 The District Court granted summary judgment to 
American Tutor in April 2018. Describing Charte as 
“engag[ing] in just the kind of litigation gamesmanship the 
entire controversy doctrine is designed to prevent,” the Court 
found that, given the circumstances, it was “fundamentally 
                                                 
17 Notwithstanding Charte’s allegations under the New Jersey 
False Claims Act, the record does not address whether the 
Attorney General of the State of New Jersey also declined to 
intervene. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:32C-5(d) (requiring the 
Attorney General to be served with, inter alia, a copy of the 
complaint); id. § 2A:32C-5(g) (requiring the Attorney 
General to “file a pleading with the court” indicating whether 
he wishes to intervene in the qui tam action). 
18 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730(b)(2), (c)(3). For the sake of brevity, 
in discussing the qui tam action, we will only refer to 
defendant American Tutor. 
19 JA 124.  
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fair” to apply the entire controversy doctrine and thus bar the 
qui tam action.20 Charte now appeals that decision.21 
 
II. 
 
Before addressing the merits of this appeal, we will 
discuss the statutory background of the False Claims Act and 
the principles underlying the entire controversy doctrine.22 
 
A. 
 
The False Claims Act imposes civil liability on anyone 
who “knowingly presents . . .  a false or fraudulent claim for 
payment or approval” to the United States Government.23 
Under the Act, “a private person (the relator) may bring a qui 
tam civil action ‘for the person and for the United States 
Government’ against the alleged false claimant, ‘in the name 
of the Government.’”24 Thus, “[t]he relator’s right to recovery 
                                                 
20 Id. at 16. 
21 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
and 31 U.S.C. § 3732. We have jurisdiction over this appeal 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over a 
district court’s application of the entire controversy doctrine. 
Ricketti v. Barry, 775 F.3d 611, 613 (3d Cir. 2015). 
22 As we previously acknowledged, Charte asserted claims 
under both the federal False Claim Act and the New Jersey 
False Claims Act. For the sake of brevity, we will focus our 
discussion on the federal False Claims Act. 
23 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A). 
24 Vt. Agency of Natural Res., 529 U.S. at 769 (quoting 31 
U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1)). Accordingly, “[t]he Government may 
dismiss the action notwithstanding the objections of the 
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exists solely as a mechanism for deterring fraud and returning 
funds to the federal treasury.”25  
 
If the Government intervenes, the relator may 
“continue as a party to the action,” but the Government has 
“the primary responsibility for prosecuting the action.”26 On 
the other hand, if the Government declines to intervene, as 
occurred here, the relator has “the right to conduct the 
action.”27 Notably, notwithstanding its initial decision to not 
intervene, the Government may subsequently intervene “upon 
a showing of good cause.”28  
 
B. 
 
The entire controversy doctrine is “essentially New 
Jersey’s specific, and idiosyncratic, application of traditional 
                                                                                                             
person initiating the action if the person has been notified by 
the Government of the filing of the motion and the court has 
provided the person with an opportunity for a hearing on the 
motion.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A). The Government may 
also “settle the action with the defendant notwithstanding the 
objections of the person initiating the action if the court 
determines, after a hearing, that the proposed settlement is 
fair, adequate, and reasonable under all the circumstances.” 
Id. § 3730(c)(2)(B). 
25 James B. Helmer, Jr., False Claims Act: Whistleblower 
Litigation 1192 (7th ed. 2017) (footnote omitted).  
26 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1).  
27 Id. § 3730(c)(3). 
28 Id.  
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res judicata principles.”29 The doctrine “embodies the 
principle that the adjudication of a legal controversy should 
occur in one litigation in only one court; accordingly, all 
parties involved in a litigation should at the very least present 
in that proceeding all of their claims and defenses that are 
related to the underlying controversy.”30 The purposes of the 
entire controversy doctrine “are threefold: (1) the need for 
complete and final disposition through the avoidance of 
piecemeal decisions; (2) fairness to parties to the action and 
those with a material interest in the action; and (3) efficiency 
and the avoidance of waste and the reduction of delay.”31 
 
In determining whether a claim is barred by the 
doctrine, a court’s “central consideration” is whether the 
claim “arise[s] from related facts or the same transaction or 
series of transactions.”32 “It is the core set of facts that 
provides the link between distinct claims against the same or 
different parties and triggers the requirement that they be 
                                                 
29 Rycoline Prod., Inc. v. C & W Unlimited, 109 F.3d 883, 
886 (3d Cir. 1997). 
30 Cogdell by Cogdell v. Hosp. Ctr. at Orange, 560 A.2d 
1169, 1172 (N.J. 1989); see Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, 
Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C., 203 A.3d 
133, 137 (N.J. 2019) (“The entire controversy doctrine ‘seeks 
to impel litigants to consolidate their claims arising from a 
single controversy whenever possible.’” (quoting Thornton v. 
Potamkin Chevrolet, 462 A.2d 133, 134 (N.J. 1983))).  
31 DiTrolio v. Antiles, 662 A.2d 494, 502 (N.J. 1995); see 
Dimitrakopoulos, 203 A.3d at 143; Wadeer v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. 
Co., 110 A.3d 19, 27 (N.J. 2015); Cogdell, 560 A.2d at 1173. 
32 DiTrolio, 662 A.2d at 502. 
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determined in one proceeding.”33 Additionally, the entire 
controversy doctrine applies “only when a prior action based 
on the same transactional facts has been tried to judgment or 
settled.”34 
 
However, the doctrine is “constrained by principles of 
equity.”35 It remains an equitable rule of preclusion “whose 
application is left to judicial discretion based on the factual 
circumstances of individual cases.”36 Accordingly, the entire 
controversy doctrine’s equitable nature “bars its application 
where to do so would be unfair in the totality of the 
circumstances and would not promote any of its objectives, 
namely, the promotion of conclusive determinations, party 
fairness, and judicial economy and efficiency.”37 
 
III. 
  
With the foregoing statutory and equitable framework 
in mind, we now turn our attention to this case. Here, the 
factual-nexus requirement of the entire controversy doctrine 
                                                 
33 Id.  
34 Arena v. Borough of Jamesburg, 706 A.2d 790, 792 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998). 
35 Dimitrakopoulos, 203 A.3d at 138. 
36 Highland Lakes Country Club & Cmty. Ass’n v. Nicastro, 
988 A.2d 90, 91 (N.J. 2009) (quoting Oliver v. Ambrose, 705 
A.2d 742, 748 (N.J. 1998)). 
37 Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 3.2 on 
R. 4:30A (2019); see also Wadeer, 110 A.3d at 27 (“In 
considering whether application of the doctrine is fair, courts 
should consider fairness to the court system as a whole, as 
well as to all parties.”). 
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is satisfied; the state court action and the qui tam action both 
relate to American Tutor’s allegedly fraudulent billing 
practices.38 Nonetheless, considering the totality of the 
circumstances, we hold that the entire controversy doctrine 
does not apply to the instant qui tam claims. 
  
 To reiterate, we must determine the preclusive effect 
of the resolution of state tort litigation on a qui tam action that 
was filed while the state action was pending. For three 
reasons, we are persuaded that preclusion would be unfair to 
both Charte as the named-party-relator and the Government 
as the real party in interest.39  
 
First, qui tam claims belong to the Government, not to 
relators. Accordingly, the qui tam claims in this case do not 
                                                 
38 At oral argument, Charte’s counsel attempted to distinguish 
the facts of the two actions. He asserted that the facts 
underlying the state court action relate to post-termination 
defamation, while the facts underlying the qui tam action 
relate to pre-termination events. We are not persuaded by this 
argument. Moreover, in briefing before the District Court in 
support of a motion to lift the seal and consolidate the actions, 
Charte asserted that the two actions “deal with the same set of 
operative facts.” D.C. No. 3-10-cv-03318, ECF No. 7-2 at 1. 
She explained that her claims “made . . . as a relator for the 
United States are the same claims that American Tutor alleges 
to be defamatory” in the state court action. Id. 
39 See United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 
556 U.S. 928, 930 (2009) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)) 
(recognizing that the United States Government “is a ‘real 
party in interest’ in a case brought under the [False Claims 
Act]”). 
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belong to Charte and did not belong to her when she entered 
into the settlement agreement. To apply the entire controversy 
doctrine and hold that the settlement agreement precludes this 
qui tam action would essentially be to endorse the opposite: 
that the qui tam action belonged to Charte and thus, that she 
could unilaterally negotiate, settle, and dismiss the qui tam 
claims during the Government’s investigatory period. Such a 
decision would not only be unfair to the Government’s 
interests, it would also conflict with the False Claims Act’s 
rule that pending qui tam actions may be voluntarily 
dismissed by relators “only if the court and the Attorney 
General give written consent to the dismissal and their 
reasons for consenting.”40 
 
Second, Charte followed every statutory requirement 
that applies to qui tam relators, including filing the qui tam 
action under seal and not disclosing its existence until ordered 
to do so by the District Court. It would therefore be a Catch-
22 for us to consider her failure to inform American Tutor of 
the qui tam action as weighing in favor of application of the 
entire controversy doctrine. 
 
Charte tried to litigate this case out in the open. Over 
the course of six months and before settling the state court 
action, she made two attempts to lift the seal on the qui tam 
action. In January 2012, at a point when the case had been 
under seal for a year and a half, Charte filed a motion to lift 
the seal and consolidate the state court action with the qui tam 
action. Three months later, in April 2012, her counsel sent a 
letter (1) reiterating the request, (2) emphasizing that time 
was of the essence because American Tutor had moved for 
                                                 
40 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1). 
16 
 
summary judgment in the state court action, and (3) stressing 
that the seal meant Charte could “make no mention of the 
pending qui tam case.”41 Charte’s hands were tied. It was not 
until August 2012—over six months after the motion to lift 
the seal was filed—that the District Court denied the motion. 
Although Charte settled the state court action before the 
District Court ruled on her motion to lift the seal and 
consolidate, the procedural history of the qui tam action 
shows that she took proactive steps to try and avoid that 
situation. Charte was thus not trying to hide the ball.42 
 
Third, and finally, application of the entire controversy 
doctrine to this case, where the relator was the defendant in a 
previously filed private suit, would incentivize potential False 
Claims Act defendants to “smoke out” qui tam actions by 
suing potential relators and then quickly settling those private 
claims with the sole purpose of subsequently relying on that 
settlement to bar a qui tam action.43 We decline to give 
                                                 
41 JA 65. 
42 We thus respectfully disagree with our dissenting 
colleague’s conclusion that the District Court’s finding that 
Charte had engaged in litigation gamesmanship “is supported 
by the record.” Dissent Op. 2. 
43 Cf. United States ex rel. Longhi v. Lithium Power Techs., 
Inc., 575 F.3d 458, 474 (5th Cir. 2009) (recognizing the 
public policy objectives of the False Claims Act and 
disapproving of possible False Claims Act defendants who 
“insulate themselves from the reach of the [False Claims Act] 
by simply forcing potential relators to sign general 
agreements invoking release and indemnification from future 
suit”).  
17 
 
potential defendants a path toward immunizing themselves 
against False Claims Act liability. 
 
Fairness thus requires that Charte have the opportunity 
to pursue this qui tam action on behalf of the Government. 
 
IV. 
 
According to American Tutor, fairness favors 
preclusion here because Charte could have, and therefore 
should have, brought the qui tam action as a counterclaim in 
state court. We disagree. 
 
As a preliminary matter, we agree with American 
Tutor that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over 
claims brought under the federal False Claims Act. The 
statutory language provides that a claim under the Act “may 
be brought in any judicial district” where a defendant “resides 
[or], transacts business, or in which any act proscribed by 
section 3729 occurred.”44 We read the broad term “judicial 
district” to include state courts.45 As a result, Charte could 
have filed the qui tam action in state court. 
 
                                                 
44 31 U.S.C. § 3732(a). 
45 Compare id. (broadly stating that “[a]ny action . . . may be 
brought in any judicial district”) with id. § 3732(b) (stating 
that “[t]he district courts shall have jurisdiction” over certain 
cases) (emphases added). See United States ex rel. Paul v. 
Parsons, Brinkerhoff, Quade & Douglas, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 
370, 375 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (concluding that “pursuant to the 
language of the statute, there is concurrent jurisdiction 
between the federal and state courts”). 
18 
 
However, we are not persuaded that she had to bring 
the qui tam claims in state court. Charte’s decision to file 
instead the claims in federal court is not the “deliberate 
manipulation and forum shopping” of a party who (i) brought 
a counterclaim in another state, only to (ii) voluntarily 
dismiss the counterclaim, and (iii) bring the same claim anew 
in New Jersey.46 Charte never brought the qui tam claims in 
the state forum, never voluntarily dismissed the claims, and 
never traveled to a different state to re-litigate the claims. 
 
American Tutor’s argument to the contrary ignores a 
crucial aspect of qui tam litigation: qui tam claims must 
remain under seal until the Government decides whether it 
will intervene.47 This rule applies in both state and federal 
courts. Therefore, even if Charte had filed her qui tam claims 
as counterclaims in the state action, American Tutor would 
have still been unaware of them.48 
                                                 
46 J-M Mfg. Co. v. Phillips & Cohen, LLP, 129 A.3d 342, 350 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015) (discussing Archbrook 
Laguna, LLC v. Marsh, 997 A.2d 1035 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2010)). 
47 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730(b)(2), (b)(4); see also N.J. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 2A:32C-5(c), (g). 
48 Our dissenting colleague emphasizes that “Charte never 
alerted the state court . . . to her qui tam claim.” Dissent Op. 
2. This is true. Charte neither filed the qui tam action in state 
court nor informed the state court that she had filed the action 
in federal court. Nevertheless, had Charte filed the qui tam 
action as a counterclaim in state court, American Tutor would 
have remained unaware. Additionally, telling the state court 
about the existence of the federal qui tam would have violated 
the seal, possibly resulting in (1) dismissal, attorney 
19 
 
V. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of American 
Tutor, and remand for further proceedings. 
                                                                                                             
discipline, or monetary penalties, see State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Co. v. United States ex rel. Rigsby, 137 S. Ct. 436, 444 
(2016), and (2) prejudice to the Government by alerting 
American Tutor of the pending federal investigation.  
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
The entire controversy doctrine is New Jersey’s 
“extremely robust claim preclusion device that requires 
adversaries to join all possible claims stemming from an event 
or series of events in one suit.” Paramount Aviation Corp. v. 
Agusta, 178 F.3d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 1999). As my colleagues 
acknowledge, all of the doctrine’s requirements are met in this 
case. They nevertheless give Appellant Jean Charte a second 
bite at the apple because of “fairness.” I agree that fairness is 
central to the doctrine, see Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 
476 A.2d 250, 253 (N.J. 1984), but that equitable notion is a 
two-way street and I think the Defendants—who thought they 
were settling their dispute with Charte—are entitled to repose 
in this lawsuit. I would affirm the District Court’s order. 
Central to my evaluation of this appeal is an important 
finding by the District Court. After giving due consideration to 
all the facts and procedural history of the case, the trial judge 
found that by purporting to settle all disputes with Defendants 
and then seeking to activate this qui tam action, Charte had 
engaged in gamesmanship. United States ex rel. Charte v. Am. 
Tutor, Inc., 2018 WL 1960448, at *7 (D.N.J. Apr. 26, 2018). I 
would give that finding the respect it is due. Institutional 
competence is especially important here, because application 
of the entire controversy doctrine is “discretionary and 
clarification of the limits of the doctrine is best left to case-by-
case determination.” Rycoline Prod., Inc. v. C & W Unlimited, 
109 F.3d 883, 886 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Circle Chevrolet Co. 
v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 662 A.2d 509, 513 (N.J. 
1995)). And the District Court’s finding is supported by the 
record. Charte waited until she had filed her federal qui tam 
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suit to make futile requests to “consolidate” the state and 
federal actions. Charte, 2018 WL 1960448, at *1. Then she 
settled in state court before the District Court had a chance to 
rule.  
Most significantly, Charte never alerted the state 
court—the court that everyone but she believed was overseeing 
the entire controversy—to her qui tam claim. Perhaps litigating 
her qui tam claim in the state proceeding would’ve been 
impractical. Perhaps she believed the state court lacked 
jurisdiction (as the Majority holds today, it did not). But those 
considerations were for the court, not Charte, to weigh. See 
Petrocelli v. Daniel Woodhead Co., 993 F.2d 27, 31 (3d Cir. 
1993). Charte’s “failure to allow the trial court the opportunity 
to manage the full controversy at the outset,” DiTrolio v. 
Antiles, 662 A.2d 494, 506 (N.J. 1995), saps her 
impracticability argument of force and suggests strategic 
behavior.1  
                                              
1 The Majority contends that, by virtue of the seal, the 
Defendants would have been unaware of Charte’s qui tam 
claim regardless whether she filed in state court or federal 
court. That is true as far as it goes. But alerting the state court 
ex parte (before filing in either federal or state court) would 
have given it the opportunity to ensure a fair adjudication of 
the entire controversy. Cf. Gelber v. Zito P’ship, 688 A.2d 
1044, 1046 (N.J. 1997) (“Quite aside from joinder of the 
controversies in either the arbitral or judicial forum, a trial 
court, once informed of related actions, can employ various 
procedural tools to prevent excessively complicated or unfair 
litigation.”). For example, the court might have required the 
Government to make its intervention decision sooner. 
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The Majority argues that Charte “followed every 
statutory requirement that applies to qui tam relators,” so it 
would be unfair to apply the entire controversy doctrine. Maj. 
Op. 15. But state court judgments “may well deprive plaintiffs 
of the ‘right’ to have their federal claims relitigated in federal 
court.” San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 
545 U.S. 323, 342 (2005). Charte’s right to litigate her qui tam 
suit in federal court does not imply a right to settle the same 
controversy in state court while evading normal preclusion 
principles.  
The Majority emphasizes that holding Charte precluded 
would be “unfair to the Government’s interests.” Maj. Op. 15; 
see id. at 17. Yet the Government consented to the District 
Court’s disposition of this case and the Government is in the 
best position to decide whether Charte’s suit would or would 
not vindicate its interests. And, contrary to the Majority’s view, 
Maj. Op. 14–15, there is little reason to think the Government 
would be precluded by the entire controversy doctrine just 
because Charte is. See Cogdell by Cogdell v. Hosp. Ctr. at 
Orange, 560 A.2d 1169, 1174 (N.J. 1989) (the entire 
controversy doctrine “tries foremost to protect an absent 
person from an adjudication of his or her interests”); cf. United 
States ex rel. Vaughn v. United Biologics, L.L.C., 907 F.3d 187, 
194 (5th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he Government should not be bound 
if the dismissal is for reasons not tied to the underlying legal 
merit.”). 
For all the procedural brainteasers qui tam preclusion 
might offer in other cases, this case is straightforward. The 
Defendants spent seven years in the dark about Charte’s qui 
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tam claim.2 For five of those years, they thought this dispute 
was behind them. Charte kept the state court in the dark too. 
The Supreme Court has observed of statutes of limitations that 
their “conclusive effects are designed to promote justice by 
preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have 
been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, 
memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared . . . . 
[T]he right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail 
over the right to prosecute them.” Order of R.R. Telegraphers 
v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1944). Fairness 
dictates the application of that same principle here.  
* * * 
“[A]t some point litigation over the particular 
controversy [must] come to an end.” Mystic Isle Dev. Corp. v. 
Perskie & Nehmad, 662 A.2d 523, 534 (N.J. 1995) (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 19 cmt. a (1982)). For 
these litigants, that point has long since passed. With respect, I 
dissent.  
                                              
2
 My colleagues correctly note that much of this delay 
was attributable to the Government’s requests for extensions, 
only some of which Charte consented to. But Charte did not try 
to force the Government’s hand until August 2017. I 
acknowledge Charte was not in the driver’s seat before the 
Government declined to intervene, but it was her decision to 
settle with Defendants while holding another claim in reserve. 
